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Under concentrated-ownership structure, the common-shared control rights shift 
to controlling shareholders. The Private Benefit of Control (PBC) arising from control 
rights induces controlling shareholders to tunnel from listed companies, which is an 
expropriation of minority shareholders. The separation of control rights and 
ownership under pyramidal-controlled structure comes with a more intensive and 
frequent tunneling. The study analyzes tunneling from the aspect of ownership, 
control rights of the ultimate owners of entrepreneur-controlled companies. 
The study firstly develops a theoretical model by combining ownership, control 
rights, separation of ownership and control rights into LLSV’s Model (2002) which 
focuses on analyzing the determinants of tunneling behaviors. Under the theoretical 
model, the study draws a primary conclusion that the lower the ownership of the 
ultimate owners, the higher control rights of the ultimate owners, the higher of the 
separation of ownership and control rights, the high the PBC is, and the ultimate 
owners have more incentives to tunnel. 
Then, the study makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between 
tunneling and ownership, control rights and separation of ownership and control rights. 
The study selects 453 entrepreneur-controlled samples from China’s listed companies 
during 2001 to 2003. By using groups’ comparison analysis, the study tests the 
correlation between ownership, control rights variables and tunneling variables. The 
major results are as follows: 
1. A statistically significant correlation exists between ownership proportion, the 
method to acquiring control rights, numbers of pyramidal layers, and income 
transferred transactions, guarantees and net receivables from ultimate owners. The 
ultimate owners are likely to tunnel more by using non-operating income-related 
transactions, guarantees and non-operating credits under a lower ownership 
proportion or acquiring control rights from buy-out, or a complicated pyramidal 
structure. 
2. The higher control proportion group is more likely to use credits to tunnel more 
compared with a lower control proportion group. On the contrary, the lower control 













3. The ownership proportion, the method of acquiring control and the number of 
pyramidal layers are more effective in explaining the ultimate owners’ decision 
between transferring incomes and sharing incomes with all shareholders. Under a 
lower ownership proportion or acquiring control from buy-out or a more pyramidal 
layers circumstance, the ultimate owners are more likely to share cash dividend with 
all shareholders. Under the contrary circumstance, they make more 
income-transferring transactions to tunnel more. 
 The expected contribution of this study is to explain the tunneling behaviors from 
ownership, control and separation of ownership and control aspects which are helpful 
in disclosing the fundamental incentive of tunneling. 
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第一章  导论 
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民营经济的影响力正在逐步提升，据国家 新统计资料表明，到 2005 年 11 月底，
中国的私营企业已经 431 万户，注册资本金 62000 亿。2001 年民营经济对 GDP
的贡献是 55％，现在已经是 65％，其中国内的民营企业的贡献是 50％，境外的
投资占 15％。国内生产总值每年递增 9.4％，这 9.4％的贡献民营经济占了一大











































其次，在 LLSV 等（2002）利益输送影响模型的基础上，引入 终控制人的
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